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Arms or Legs: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games
By James C. Cox and Duncan James

Arms or Legs: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games1
Centipede games and Dutch auctions provide important instances in which game theory fails
empirically. The reasons for these empirical failures are not well understood. Standard
centipede games and Dutch auctions differ from each other in terms of their Institutional Format
(IF), Dynamic Structure (DS), and Information Environment (IE). This paper introduces new
games that are constructed from centipede games and Dutch auctions by interchanging some of
their IF, DS, and IE characteristics. The new games are introduced in isomorphic pairs.
Experiment treatments with pairs of new isomorphic games provide data that yield insights into
the effects on behavior of games’ IF, DS, and IE characteristics. (JEL C72, C91, D44)

1. Introduction
Dutch auctions and centipede games both exhibit systematic deviations of behavior in
experiments from predictions of game theory. Theory for the centipede game predicts unraveling
to a “take” at the first node in the game tree but failure of this prediction for the traditional twoperson, extensive form of the game is a robust empirical phenomenon (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1992, 1998; Zauner, 1999). Theory predicts that the Dutch auction is isomorphic to the first price
sealed bid auction but prices in a fast-clock Dutch auction are lower and prices in a slow-clock
Dutch auction are higher than prices in comparable first price sealed bid auctions (Cox, Roberson,
and Smith, 1982; Cox Smith and Walker, 1983; Lucking-Reilly, 1999; Katok and Kwasnica,
2008). The reasons for these empirical failures of theory are not well understood. This paper
seeks better understanding of the determinants of behavior in centipede games and Dutch
auctions by studying new games constructed by interchanging some of the games’ typical
characteristics.
Standard centipede games and Dutch auctions differ from each other in terms of their
Institutional Format (IF), Dynamic Structure (DS), and Information Environment (IE). The IF of
a standard centipede game is an extensive form game tree whereas the IF of a standard Dutch
auction is a price clock. The DS of a standard centipede game is alternating opportunity to select
an action (take or pass) whereas the DS of a standard Dutch auction is simultaneous opportunity
1
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to select an action (bid or don’t bid). The IE of a standard centipede game is public information
on (money) payoffs whereas the IE of a standard Dutch auction is private information on payoffs
(because auctioned item values are private). This paper introduces new games that are constructed
by interchanging some of the IF, DS, and IE characteristics of the standard games. The paper
reports an experiment with the new games that provides insight into which characteristics of
games are empirically significant determinants of behavior and which of these significant
characteristics account for systematic differences between theory and behavior.
We construct modified centipede games that have the same IE as standard Dutch
auctions: the independent private values environment in which an agent knows her own payoffs
but only the probability distribution of others’ payoffs for all decision opportunities. We use
independent private values (IPV) rather than public information (PI) about payoffs because: (a)
the unraveling prediction for centipede games is robust to IPV; but (b) the Nash equilibrium bid
functions for Dutch auctions are not robust to PI about auctioned item values. We construct
modified Dutch auctions that have the same DS as standard centipede games: alternating (rather
than simultaneous) opportunities to bid or not bid. We construct modified centipede games that
have the same DS as standard Dutch auctions: simultaneous (rather than alternating) opportunities
to take or pass. We construct modified centipede games that have the same IF as standard Dutch
auctions: a decreasing price clock. Finally, we construct Dutch auctions with the IF that
characterizes standard centipede games: an extensive form game tree. The paired clock and tree
formats for the modified Dutch auctions are theoretically isomorphic. A theoretical isomorphism
also holds for the paired clock and tree formats of the modified centipede games. Because the
paired games are strategically equivalent, any significant differences in behavior between them
are caused by behavioral significance of characteristics of games that are not captured by existing
theory of equilibrium strategies.
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2. Related Literature
There is a substantial literature on experimental tests of the theory of Dutch auctions and
centipede games. We review a few papers.

2.1 Dutch Auctions
In his book on the history of auctions, Cassady (1967) discusses auction market formats that have
been used for long historical periods. He defines “Dutch auction” as follows (Cassady, 1967, p.
67):
In this auction the offer price starts at an amount believed to be higher than any
bidder is willing to pay and is lowered by an auctioneer or a clock device until one of
the bidders accepts the last offer. The first and only bid is the sales price in the Dutch
auction.
One implication of this institutional format is that any bidder who stops the auction near the
beginning is likely to lose money. This is the defining characteristic of “Dutch auction” that we
do not change when new modified versions are introduced by changing the standard game’s IF
and DS characteristics.
Vickrey (1961) first explained that the Dutch auction is theoretically isomorphic to the
first price sealed bid auction in the IPV information environment. This implies that the Nash
equilibrium bid function is the same function for these two auctions even though the Dutch
auction has a decreasing price clock, real-time institutional format whereas the first price sealed
bid auction has a normal form game format. Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) tested this
isomorphism using a Dutch auction digital price clock with two-second price decrement speed.2
They reported that the isomorphism failed empirically; the Dutch auction produced lower prices
than the first price auction in laboratory experiments using (induced) independent private values.

2
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Cox, Roberson, and Smith offered two “real time” models of the Dutch auction, using nonstandard assumptions, both of which were consistent with lower prices in the Dutch auction than
in the first price auction. One model incorporated a utility from the activity of playing the game
that was additive to the utility of money payoff from bidding whereas the other model
incorporated biased application of Bayes’ rule in updating bidders’ expectations about rivals’
bidding behavior during an auction. Cox, Smith, and Walker (1983) reported an experimental test
of the alternative models which led to rejection of the utility of playing the game model in favor
of the biased Bayes’ rule model.
Lucking-Reiley (1999) reported an internet experiment with uncontrolled information
environment (concerning item values) and an extremely slow Dutch price clock. He found that
the Dutch and first price auction isomorphism failed but that Dutch prices were higher than prices
in the first price auction. Katok and Kwasnica (2008) reported an experiment in the IPV
information environment in which Dutch auction clock speed was a treatment variable. They
reported that the isomorphism failed and that Dutch auction prices were lower (respectively,
higher) than prices in the first price auction with a fast (respectively, slow) Dutch price clock. The
clock format Dutch auctions and centipede games reported below use a 10-second price clock
speed, which is in the middle of the clock speeds used as treatment variables by Katok and
Kwasnica (the other two speeds they used were one-second and 30-seconds). Our tree format
centipede games and Dutch auctions use a comparable 10-second decision opportunity at each
node in the extensive form game tree.3

3

Turocy, Watson, and Battalio (2007) replicated the result that prices are lower in Dutch auctions than in
(theoretically-isomorphic) first price auctions using a Dutch auction clock speed that was calibrated to
approximately equate the total time used by subjects in experiments with either 60 first price auctions or 60
Dutch auctions.

5
2.2 Centipede Games
In a standard centipede game, the payoff of each player is positive at his first decision node. This
is the defining characteristic of “centipede game” that we do not change when new modified
versions are introduced by changing the standard game’s IF and IE characteristics. The centipede
game is typically implemented in a public information environment in which the payoffs of all
players at all decision nodes are public information. A sequential move structure is standard.
Each player has his own decision nodes to choose “take” or “pass.” If a player chooses the action
“pass,” this leads to an increase in the sum of payoffs across players but hands the next “take”
opportunity to the other player.
A typical centipede game included in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) is shown in Figure 1
(with payoff of agent 1, or “you” in bold).

Figure 1. A Typical McKelvey and Palfrey Centipede Game

These payoffs differ from those modeled by Aumann (1995) in a notable way; the final node
payoffs in Aumann’s centipede game are zero for every player. In contrast, the total payoff to all
players in a typical McKelvey and Palfrey centipede game increases throughout the game. The
choice of final node payoffs in our centipede games is determined by the pairing with Dutch
auctions. If the Dutch auction price clock ticks to zero (or to a positive seller reserve price)
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without any bidder choosing to buy then all bidders receive zero surplus. Hence the natural
pairing of centipede games with Dutch auctions is to set all players’ payoffs to zero at the final
node in a centipede game, as in Aumann’s (1995) game.
The centipede game presents a tension between what economists might suppose to be an
agent’s wish to obtain a higher payoff for himself, by waiting to take, and a desire to avoid
getting zero (or a low) payoff by waiting so long that the other player takes first. This tension
within an agent, and the potential for each agent to develop beliefs about this tension (and other
possible motivations) in other agents makes the centipede game a potential test-bed for
hypotheses on a range of subjects.
For instance, does the predicted subgame perfect outcome (taking at the first node) occur
in experiments? McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) found that generally it did not. What are the
implications of such observations? Can failure to play according to the theoretical prediction be
taken as evidence of altruism, decision errors, or beliefs that other altruistic or error-prone agents
might be present in the population from which opponents are drawn? A number of researchers
have attempted to explain the disparity between the empirical results and the theoretical
prediction using one or another such explanation. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) discussed the
possibility that subjects’ altruism could explain the empirical failure of the unraveling prediction.
In a subsequent paper, McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) examined the explanatory possibilities of a
particular error-in-choice model, quantal response equilibrium. Zauner (1999) examined the
possibility that “independent perturbed payoffs” could explain the data (and estimated the
magnitude of noise in perceived payoffs needed to do so).
Fitting new models to data from a particular game is one way to attempt to understand
what is going on in that kind of game. Another approach is to vary characteristics of the game in
order to assess their significance as determinants of behavior. Rapoport, Stein, Parco, and
Nicholas (2003) varied parameters of the design of the centipede game (such as the number of
players and the magnitude of the payoffs) in order to assess whether the traditional result of
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failure to unravel was still observed. They reported that moving from two to three players and
increasing the size of payoffs appeared to increase the incidence of unraveling. Further work by
Murphy, Rapoport, and Parco (2006) investigates the effect of moving from n=3 to n=7 players,
and of changing the proportions according to which total payoffs at a node are allocated across
the one “winner” and the n-1 “losers.” They find a strong effect from the increase in numbers and
a milder effect from the change in allocation of payoffs. Our paper also takes the approach of
varying characteristics of the game in order to better understand its properties. Our paper differs
from Rapoport, et al. (2003) and Murphy, et al. (2006) in that we focus on systematic variation in
institutional format and dynamic structure rather than variations in number of players or size of
the total payoff for all players or the split of total payoff across winners and losers.
In order to identify the role of institutional format, it is necessary that an exact
correspondence in message spaces across isomorphic games be maintained. This design principle,
already put forth for the comparison of the Dutch auction and the first price sealed bid auction by
Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982), is similarly applicable to IPV centipede games presented in
different institutional formats (i.e. clock versus tree). Thus we compare tree format to clock
format while holding constant dynamic structure (encompassing sequential/alternating versus
simultaneous move structure) , payoff incrementation per discrete unit of time, and number of
players. We also compare simultaneous move structure to sequential/alternating move structure
while holding constant institutional format, payoff incrementation per discrete unit of time, and
number of players.
Our paper contributes to the literature by experimenting with the effects of changes in
institutional format, dynamic structure, and information environment in new games derived from
standard centipede games and Dutch auctions. If changes in IF, DS, or IE produce significant
changes in behavior, this would suggest that parameters from models such as quantal response
equilibrium or independent perturbed payoffs would have to vary across different representations
of the same game, thus leading one to reflect upon the generality of those models. We look at
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both Dutch auctions and centipede games in the same study because this allows us to ascertain if
any dependence of bids or takes on IF, DS, or IE characteristics generalizes across games.
Additionally, it should be noted that complete unraveling of the centipede game (however
parameterized) with only two players and few repetitions would be a new type of empirical result.

2.3 Maintained Difference between Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games
Our experiment implements modified forms of Dutch auctions and centipede games that are
constructed by changing some of the IF, DS, and IE characteristics of the traditional games. This
suggests the question of what characteristic(s) of the modified games separate centipede games
from Dutch auctions. We maintain one distinction between the two types of games: the games are
always parameterized so that theory predicts unraveling to the first decision opportunity (tree
node or clock tick) in any centipede game whereas theory predicts interior (to the decision space)
Nash equilibrium in any Dutch auction.

2.4 Varying Game Forms
What accounts for the failure of Nash equilibrium bidding theory to predict prices in Dutch
auctions? Previous literature has offered two explanations: (a) underestimation of the risk of
letting the clock continue to run as, for example, in the Bayes’ rule miscalculation model (Cox,
Roberson, and Smith, 1982; Cox, Smith, and Walker, 1983); and (b) bidder impatience as, for
example, in the model in Katok and Kwasnica (2008). The sequential bid form of the Dutch
auction that we implement may make the risk from letting the clock continue to run be more
salient. Furthermore the sequential bid form of the Dutch auction may make impatience more
pronounced by doubling (from one to two) the number of clock ticks between successive bid
opportunities. Our experimental design does not address the distinction between the possible
effects of Bayes rule violation and impatience.

Instead, we ask whether failure of Nash

equilibrium bidding theory is robust to changes in the IF and DS of the bidding game.
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What accounts for the empirical failure of the unraveling prediction in standard centipede
games? Is it the public information environment, which makes salient the exact opportunity cost
of the other player from passing at each node? We introduce the independent private values form
of the centipede game, which makes it impossible for a player to know the other player’s exact
opportunity cost at any decision node but preserves the pattern of increasing opportunity costs for
both players. And, just as we do with the Dutch auction, we vary the IF and DS of the game to see
whether failure of the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is robust to such changes.

3. Clock and Tree Formats with Sequential or Simultaneous Moves
We explain clock and tree formats of Dutch auctions and centipede games with independent
private values. Each (clock or tree) format of the Dutch auction or centipede game is developed
with alternative dynamic structures involving sequential or simultaneous move (bid or take)
opportunities.

3.1. Sequential-Move Dutch and Centipede Clock Games
The sequential-bid Dutch auction with clock format is simply the traditional Dutch auction with
the one change that the bidders alternate price clock ticks at which they are allowed to bid. That
is, for a given clock reading, only one bidder has the right to bid at that clock price; the other
bidder(s) would have to wait until the clock counts down to their turn before they would have a
chance to bid. In the two-bidder, $1.00 price decrement case we utilize in our design, the price on
the clock starts at 11 and one bidder can bid at price clock readings of 10, 8, 6, 4, or 2 while the
other bidder can bid at clock readings of 9, 7, 5, 3, or 1. The bidders’ private values for the
auctioned item are independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [1.01, 1.02, …, 10.99,
11.00], which supports an interior Nash equilibrium (as shown below in section 4.1). This
version of the Dutch auction is presented to bidders as shown in Figure 2 (for the first price tick).
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Figure 2. Clock Format Sequential Bid Dutch Auction

The sequential-take IPV centipede game with clock format maintains the DS of
alternating decision opportunities that characterizes the traditional game but incorporates that DS
into a price clock IF. The IPV centipede game in clock format (and tree format) replaces the
public information IE of the traditional centipede game with private information about players’
payoffs. In the two-player, $1.00 price tick decrement game we utilize in our design, one player
can take at price clock readings of 10, 8, 6, 4, or 2 while the other player can take at price clock
readings of 9, 7, 5, 3, or 1. The players’ private values are independently drawn from the uniform
distribution on [11.01, 11.02,…, 20.99, 21.00], which supports an unraveling prediction (as
shown below in section 4.4). This version of the centipede game is presented to subjects exactly
as the clock auction shown in Figure 2, except the players’ private values (seen in the upper left
of the display) would be higher (specifically, between 11.01 and 21.00).
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3.2 Sequential-Move Centipede and Dutch Tree Games
We use an IPV information environment for our version of the sequential-take centipede game in
tree format (as well as clock format). Each player has an initial value drawn from a uniform
distribution on [0.01, 0.02, …, 9.99, 10.00], to which an amount n is added at each subsequent
decision node n = 1, 2,…, 10, which supports an unraveling prediction (as shown in section 4.3).
A player’s payoff from taking at node n (when possible) is v j  n , where v j is the player’s
private value. Each player can only see that the other player has some unknown initial value “v
not i,” to which is added $2.00 at each of the subsequent other player’s decision nodes. The
centipede game in tree format is presented to the subjects as shown in Figure 3 (with “live”
decision node indicated by the star at the first node). With each “pass” the star indicating live
node moves to the right.

Figure 3. Tree Format Sequential Move Centipede Game

The sequential-bid Dutch auction in tree format (as well as clock format) uses the DS of
alternating bid opportunities instead of the simultaneous bid opportunities of the traditional Dutch
auction. The tree format Dutch auction represents the auction with an extensive form game tree
rather than a price clock. Each bidder has an initial value drawn from the uniform distribution on
[-9.99, -9.98, …, -0.01, 0.00], to which an amount n is added at each subsequent decision node
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n , which supports an interior Nash equilibrium (as shown in section 4.2). A bidder’s payoff from
bidding at a node n (when possible) is v j  n , where v j is the bidder’s private value for the
auctioned item. As in traditional IPV Dutch auctions (Vickrey, 1961), each bidder knows his own
auctioned item value but only knows the distribution from which the other bidder’s value is
drawn. The Dutch auction in tree format is presented to the subjects exactly as the centipede
game in Figure 3, except the payoffs are lower (specifically, they are consistent with vj being
between -9.99 and 0.00).

3.3 Simultaneous-Move Dutch and Centipede Clock Games
The simultaneous-bid Dutch auction in clock format is the standard form of that auction. The
simultaneous-take IPV centipede game in clock format differs from the standard centipede game
in IF, DS and IE: the clock format is used; each player can take at every node; and players’
payoffs are private information.

3.4 Simultaneous-Move Centipede and Dutch Tree Games
The simultaneous-bid Dutch auction in tree format differs from the standard Dutch auction only
in its IF: a tree format is used rather than a clock format. The simultaneous-take IPV centipede
game with tree format, shown in Figure 4, differs from the standard centipede game in DS and IE:
each player can take at every node and players’ payoffs are private information.
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Figure 4. Simultaneous Move Tree Format Games

4. Theoretical Predictions
For the two games in each pair to be isomorphic, they need to have the same dynamic structure.
Implementing this structure entailed a list of features. First, we made the role of time identical
across clock format and tree format; that is, both formats allowed subjects 10 seconds at a given
price clock reading or decision node in the tree in which the subject could click with a mouse to
bid or take.4 If at the end of 10 seconds the subject had not bid or taken, the game advanced to
the next price clock reading or decision node in the tree; the subject could not actively select “not
to bid” or “not to take” but could only do so by waiting 10 seconds for the computer to advance
the game. Second, we set the change in payoff from one decision opportunity to the next one
(belonging to the other player) equal to $1.00 across all games in all sessions. Third, all games
were constructed so as to have a default setting of zero payoffs for both players in the event of
“no bid” in the auction or “no take” in the centipede game. We did this because we needed the
same end-of-game payoffs across games to preserve isomorphism and because the default of “no
transaction” is what is natural for Dutch auctions. Also, the fact that some existing centipede

4

Data reported in Katok and Kwasnica (2008) make clear that clock speed affects outcomes in Dutch clock
auctions. This suggests that clock speed could affect outcomes in centipede clock games and that node
decision time could affect outcomes in Dutch and centipede tree games.
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experiments were structured with a (0,0) terminal node encouraged us in settling on this
standardization.

4.1 Predictions for the Sequential-Bid Dutch Auction with Clock Format
In our sequential Dutch auction with clock format, the odd-price bidder can bid at clock prices of
9, 7, 5, 3, and 1. The even-price bidder can bid at clock prices of 10, 8, 6, 4, and 2. The two
bidders’ values for the auctioned item are independently drawn from the uniform distribution on
[1.01, 1.02, …, 10.99, 11.00]. The item values and bids are (of necessity) discrete, hence the bid
functions are step functions. The risk neutral Nash equilibrium bid functions for odd-price bidder
and even-price bidder are as follows. Let bso [lso , hso ] denote that values in the range [lso , hso ]
support a Nash equilibrium bid of bso on the Dutch price clock by the odd-price bidder, for whom

bso  {9, 7,5,3,1} . Similarly, let bte [lte , hte ] denote that values in the range [lte , hte ] support a
Nash equilibrium bid of bte on the Dutch price clock by the even-price bidder for whom

bte  {10,8, 6, 4, 2} . No values support bids of 9 or 7 by the odd-node bidder. Similarly, no values
support bids of 10 or 8 by the even-price bidder. The other parts of the of the Nash equilibrium
bid functions are:
Odd-price Bidder: 5[7.25, 11.00], 3[3.59, 7.24], 1[1.01, 3.58]
Even-price Bidder: 6[9.32, 11.00], 4[5.41, 9.31], 2[2.00, 5.40]
The bid functions were solved for numerically. The numerical procedure consists of:
(1) Initializing each bidder’s probability of bidding at each of the ten clock prices at
which they can bid at 1/10.
(2) Calculating the expected value maximizing bids for each bidder, given the
probabilities of winning (at each price) implied by the opposing bidder’s probabilities of bidding
in step (1).
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(3) Updating the probability of bidding at a given price (for each bidder) based on the
expected value maximizing bids in step (2).
(4) Looping through steps (2) and (3) until mutual best response bid functions are
obtained for both bidders.

4.2 Predictions for the Sequential-Bid Dutch Auction with Tree Format
The odd-price bidder and even-price bidder Nash equilibrium bid functions for the tree-format
sequential Dutch auction are a translation of the clock-format bid functions, as can be seen from
the following. Let X j , j  1, 2, denote the random variables for the two bidders’ item values in
the clock format auction. Let x j , j  1, 2, denote the two bidder’s realized values in the auction.
Bidder j knows that her own payoff from bidding at price clock tick t when it is her turn is

xt  11  t (because the clock price is 10 at tick 1). Bidder j does not know bidder k ' s ( k  j )
payoff from bidding at any permissible tick  ; instead, it is the random variable X k  11   .
Let Y j , j  1, 2, denote the random variables for the two bidders’ item values in the tree
format Dutch auction and let y j , j  1, 2, denote their realized values. Bidder j knows that his
own value from bidding at any node n (when it is his turn) is y j  n . Bidder j does not know
bidder k ' s ( k  j ) value from bidding at node  ; instead, it is the random variable Yk   .
The clock format and tree format Dutch auctions are isomorphic in the following sense.
At tick t  s and node n  s , the random payoffs from bidding in the clock and tree format
auctions are, respectively, X j  11  s and Y j  s . Recall that X j is uniformly distributed
between 1.01 and 11.00 whereas Y j is uniformly distributed between -9.99 and 0.00. Therefore,
at any tick = node = s , the probability distributions of X j  11  s and Y j  s are identical and
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hence the probability distributions of bids are predicted to be identical in the clock and tree
format Dutch auctions.

4.3 Predictions for the Sequential-Take IPV Centipede Game with Tree Format
The tree format centipede game with sequential take opportunities and independent private values
has a subgame perfect equilibrium similar to that associated with the traditional public value
centipede game. This can be seen as follows. Let the two players have any two values, v1 and v2
drawn from the support [0.01, 0.02, …, 9.99, 10.00] for the uniform distribution of values. This
creates a situation where player 1 could earn v1 +1 at her first take node, v1 +3 at her second take
node, or v1 +5, v1 +7, or v1 +9 at her successive take nodes, while the second mover could earn

v2 +2, v2 +4, v2 +6, v2 +8, or v2 +10 at her take nodes. The player who does not take earns zero at
all nodes. If neither player has taken by the time the second player’s final take node has timed out
(after 10 seconds), both players earn zero. This suggests that if the second player’s final take node
were to be reached, the second player would take and would earn v2 +10 while the first player
would receive zero. A rational first player would anticipate this, and take at the preceding node;
but a rational second player would anticipate this, and take at the preceding node, and so on. This
argument leads to prediction of a take at the first node. Therefore, the theoretical prediction for
the IPV centipede game is unraveling to a take at the first node, the same as theory predicts for
the traditional centipede game with public values.

4.4 Predictions for the Sequential-Take IPV Centipede Game with Clock Format
The same (unraveling) subgame perfect equilibrium applies to the clock format centipede game,
as shown by the following. Let Y j , j  1, 2, denote the two players’ random values in the tree
format centipede game and let X j , j  1, 2, denote their values in the clock format game. Let
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y j and x j , j  1, 2, denote the players’ realized values. Player j knows that his own payoff
from taking at node n in the tree game (when it is his turn) is y j  n . Player j does not know
player k ' s ( k  j ) payoff from taking (when permitted) at node  in the game tree; instead, it
is the random variable Yk   . Similarly, player j ' s payoff from taking at tick t in the clock
format centipede game is x j  11  t (because the price on the clock is 10 at tick 1). Player j
knows that player k ' s ( k  j ) payoff from taking at tick  in the clock format game is the
random variable X k  11   .
The tree format and clock format IPV centipede games have the same (unraveling)
equilibrium because of their different uniform distributions of values. At node n  s and tick

t  s , the random payoffs from taking in the tree format and clock format games are,
respectively, Y j  s and X j  11  s . Recall that Y j is uniformly distributed between 1.01 and
11.00 whereas X j is uniformly distributed between 11.01 and 21.00. Therefore, at any node =
tick = s , the probability distributions of Y j  s and X j  11  s are identical.

4.5 Predictions for the Simultaneous-Bid Dutch Auction with Clock Format
The risk neutral bid function for the simultaneous-bid Dutch with clock format and values drawn
from a uniform distribution on [1.01, 1.02, …, 10.99, 11.00] and with each player able to bid at
10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 are as follows. Let bs [ls , hs ] denote that values in the range [ls , hs ]
support a Nash equilibrium bid at price bs on the Dutch price clock. No values support bids of
10, 9, 8, 7, or 6. The other parts of the of the Nash equilibrium bid function are:
Both Bidders: 5[7.67, 11.00], 4[6.46, 7.66], 3[4.16, 6.45], 2[2.47, 4.15], 1[1.01, 2.46]
The bid function was solved for numerically. This was done by applying the FindRoot routine in
Mathematica 6.0 to a system of equations embodying conditions 1 through 4 in Chwe (1988).

18
Chwe’s conditions 1 through 4 characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibrium bid function in a
first price sealed bid auction with a discrete bid space. Our numerical solution satisfies the
inequalities in Chwe’s Proposition 1. The theoretical isomorphism between the first price sealed
bid auction and the Dutch auction is then invoked to apply that solution in the present setting.

4.6 Predictions for the Simultaneous-Bid Dutch Auction with Tree Format
Arguments similar to those in subsections 4.2 and 4.5 can be used to derive the Nash equilibrium
bid function for the simultaneous-bid Dutch auction with tree format. With initial values X j , j
= 1,2 drawn from the uniform distribution on [-9.99, -9.98, …, -0.01, 0.00] and payoffs for
exiting at node n given by X j + n , the Nash equilibrium strategy function is as follows. Let

tn [ln , hn ] denote that values in the range [ln , hn ] support a Nash equilibrium take at node n . No
initial values correspond to taking at any of the first five nodes. The other parts of the Nash
equilibrium strategy function are:
Both Bidders: 6[-3.33, 0.00], 7[-4.54, -3.34], 8[-6.84, -4.55], 9[-8.53, -6.85], 10[-9.99, -8.54]

4.7 Predictions for the Simultaneous-Take IPV Centipede Game with Tree Format
The tree format centipede game with simultaneous take opportunities and independent private
values has a subgame perfect equilibrium similar to that associated with the traditional public
value centipede game with sequential take opportunities. This can be seen as follows. Let the two
players have any two values, v1 and v2 drawn from the support [0.01, 0.02, …, 9.99, 10.00] for
the uniform distribution of values. This creates a situation where player a would earn va + t if she
takes at node t = 1, 2, …, 10 while player b would earn vb + t if he takes at node t. The player
who does not take earns zero. If both players try to take at the same node, the probability that
either succeeds in taking (by entering the take response first) is 1/2. If neither player has taken by
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the time the final take node has timed out (after 10 seconds), both players earn zero. Therefore if
node 10 (the final take node) were to be reached, both players would want to take at that node,
and the probability that either would succeed would by 1/2. A rational player would anticipate
this, and consider the expected payoff from taking at node 9. If player k does not try to take at
round 9 then player j prefers to take because she would succeed with probability 1 and receive
payoff v j + 9, which is greater than the expected payoff from waiting until node 10, which is 1/2

 ( v j + 10). If player k does try to take at round 9 then player j prefers to take because she would
succeed with probability 1/2 and receive expected payoff 1/2  ( v j + 9), which is greater than the
zero amount that would be received from not trying to take at round 9. Therefore each player
prefers to take rather than pass at round 9. Similar reasoning shows that each player prefers to
take rather than pass at round 8, and so on back to round 1. Therefore, the theoretical prediction
for the simultaneous move IPV centipede game is unraveling to a take at the first node, the same
as theory predicts for the traditional centipede game with sequential moves and public values.

4.8 Predictions for the Simultaneous-Take IPV Centipede Game with Clock Format
Arguments similar to those in subsections 4.3 and 4.7 can be used to derive the subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy function for the simultaneous-take centipede game with clock format. Initial
values x j , j = 1,2, are drawn from the uniform distribution on [11.01, 11.02, …, 20.99, 21.00]
and payoff is x j  p j for taking at clock tick t , with price equal to pt  11  t , for Reasoning as
above leads to the conclusion that play unravels to a take at the first tick of the price clock at a
price equal to 10.
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5. Experiment Design
In this section we describe details of the experiment design. In section 3 we described how to
implement two (isomorphic) versions of each game. We now explain how non-essential
differences across different games are eliminated by judicious parameterization. We present a
matrix of treatments and a discussion of treatment sequencing to show how all of this allows for
an assessment of how observed behavior can be inconsistent with theoretical isomorphisms and
how such inconsistencies, if observed, can be attributed to behavioral properties of alternative
institutional formats.
In addition to design choices intended primarily to hold constant dynamic structure across
institutional formats, we also made certain design choices in order to minimize the differences in
parameterization across treatments. We did this so as to minimize potential sources of confounds.
First, we used an 11 tick clock or 11 node tree in every treatment. Second, all games utilized an
independent private values information environment; again, this removes a potential confounding
difference for interpreting results across games. Third, all games utilized a uniform distribution
with a support width of $10.00 as the source of independent private values; again, this
standardization removes an impediment to comparisons across games. Finally, it should be
pointed out that when all of these design choices were implemented, it left a design where all it
took to switch between the sequential Dutch auction and the IPV centipede game was a $10.00
shift in the location (low value, high value, or midrange) of the $10.00 wide uniform distribution
used to generate independent private values.
The experiment design implements two key objectives. First, the design can detect
inconsistencies with theoretical isomorphisms – between the clock and tree formats of the Dutch
auction and between the clock and tree formats of the IPV centipede game. Second, the design
allows us to ascertain whether any such violation can be attributed to institutional format; in
particular, the design allows us to ascertain whether any difference between clock and tree
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formats is similar or dissimilar in Dutch auctions and centipede games. The experiment includes
the treatments listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Experiment Treatments
Sequential IPV

Sequential

Simultaneous IPV

Simultaneous

Centipede Games

Dutch Auctions

Centipede Games

Dutch Auctions

Tree Format

Treatment 1

Treatment 3

Treatment 5

Treatment 7

Clock Format

Treatment 2

Treatment 4

Treatment 6

Treatment 8

If there is a difference in the distributions of bids for Treatment 3 (T3) and Treatment 4
(T4) then the isomorphism across institutional formats of the sequential Dutch auction fails. If
there is a difference in the distributions of takes between T1 and T2 then the isomorphism across
institutional formats of the sequential-take IPV centipede game fails. If such failure is observed,
are there any generalizable regularities associated with that failure? For instance, if different
distributions of bids are observed for T3 and T4, which distribution is closer to the Nash
equilibrium prediction? If T1 and T2 yield different distributions of takes, which is associated
with earlier takes? And does either the clock format or the tree format lead to earlier or later bids
or takes across games, such that this aspect of the results would appear to be driven by
institutional format rather than characteristics of the games captured by existing theory?
With this in mind, the details of sequencing of our design were as follows.

Each

experiment session took approximately 2 hours. In each session, we ran subjects through three
treatments with 10 rounds in each treatment. No subject participated in more than one session.
The first, second, and third sets of 10 rounds are referred to, respectively, as parts 1, 2, and 3. We
used the following sequences of treatments in parts 1, 2, and 3: T3-T4-T3, T3-T2-T3, T4-T3-T4,
T4-T1-T4, T2-T1-T2, T2-T3-T2, T1-T2-T1, and T1-T4-T1.

For example, the first listed

treatment sequence consisted of 10 rounds of T3 in part 1, followed by 10 rounds of T4 in part 2,
followed by 10 rounds of T3 in part 3. We experimented with these treatment sequences so as to
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allow for detection of as full as possible set of potential sequencing effects, and to provide for a
variety of across-subjects and within-subjects comparisons to be made. We deliberately did not
run T1-T3-T1, T3-T1-T3, T2-T4-T2, or T4-T2-T4 sequences, however. This was because for
these latter sequences, the only difference in instructions between treatments is the value support
– all other text in the instructions remains the same – and we were concerned that subjects might
mistakenly think the instructions were exactly the same, potentially even neglecting to read them.
Other details of the experiment are as follows. We used an integer clock price decrement
and node payment increment in all treatments to facilitate quick recognition of payoff information
by subjects. We used a 2 to 1 experimental dollar to U.S. dollar exchange rate; this was needed to
keep payments affordable if we were going to keep using a $10.00-wide uniform distribution for
value draws. We did not just shrink all numbers by 50% to keep payoffs affordable because we
wanted integer payoff changes between decision opportunities, as noted above.

6. Results
Experiment sessions were run in the laboratory of the Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN)
at Georgia State University during 2007 - 2008. The data are as follows.

6.1 Sequential Dutch Results
The data show a dramatic difference in behavior across isomorphic versions of the sequential
Dutch auction employing different institutional formats. This can be seen in a number of ways.
First of all, one can pool data across all sessions for the same treatment (e.g. all rounds from all
parts for T4 from all experiment sessions are analyzed as belonging to one distribution) and
perform rank-sum tests to ascertain whether we can reject the hypothesis that the distribution of
deviations from predictions for T4 is the same as the distribution of deviations from predictions
for T3. The rank-sum tests performed on pooled data supports the conclusion that the distribution
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of deviations is different across the institutional formats in T3 and T4.5 Specifically, we find that
such a rank-sum test returns a p-value of 0.0000.
To further illustrate the nature of the results, consider the following plot of market prices
(or winning bids) from round 1 of part 1 (for which a rank-sum test of difference in distribution
between (all) round 1 data from T4 and (all) round 1 data from T3 gives a p-value of 0.000).
Figure 5 shows bar graphs for the numbers of observations at various market prices (or winning
bids) for the clock and tree formats. Auction prices increase as one moves up the vertical axis
from 0 to 10. Clock ticks for winning bids and tree nodes for successful takes decrease up the
vertical axis.
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Figure 5. Bids in Sequential-bid Dutch Auctions

5

These tests potentially understate the difference between T4 and T3. There are particular rounds where it
is practically impossible to detect any difference in behavior across treatments because the drawn values
are extremely low for all of the subjects. For example, if the Even bidder has a value of, say 2.47, and the
Odd bidder has a value of 1.80, then almost all the data is going to be in the form of a spike at $2.00
(barring errors) in both treatments. In such a round, it would be impossible to detect a difference in
subjects’ approach to bidding (across institutional game formats) even if it otherwise existed. Round 5 in
Part 1 is one such round.
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Clearly the distributions of winning bids are very different across institutional formats, with
higher bids observed in the clock format. Note also that in round 1 of part 1, the risk neutral Nash
Equilibrium prediction for either format is to bid at 5.
This leads us to our next point: that in addition to comparing behavior across institutional
formats, we can compare behavior from a single format to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium
predicted bids. For the tree format of the sequential Dutch auction, we find that a p-value of
0.0949 on a rank-sum test on whether the distribution of deviations from theoretical predictions in
T3 differ from a distribution of zeroes (representing perfect adherence to the theory). The data
might best be described as noisily “risk neutral” because the average deviation of all pooled data
in T3 is equal to -0.02672. The average deviation from the predicted bid was a little less than
three cents (on the side of underbidding) in this experiment in which values were drawn over a
$10.00-wide interval. Rather than picking up any asymmetry relative to the risk neutral
prediction, the rank-sum test is instead picking up (to a degree) the substantial, but essentially
symmetrical, variance around the prediction that exists in the T3 data.
We can perform a similar analysis for the clock format of the sequential Dutch auction,
comparing bids therein to the predictions from section 4.1. In making this comparison, we find
that a rank-sum test of whether the distribution of deviations is different from a distribution
consisting entirely of zeroes returns a p-value of 0.0000. Here, this reflects consistent
overbidding, relative to the prediction, on the part of subjects in T4; the average deviation from
the risk neutral Nash prediction (over all of T4) is 0.6545.
Graphically, a time series plot of the average deviation from the theoretical prediction, in
each round, for each of T3 and T4, shows both how the results differ across treatments and where
they sit relative to the theoretical prediction in each round.
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Figure 6. Bid Deviations in Sequential-bid Dutch Auctions

6.2 Sequential IPV Centipede Results
Behavior is also different across institutional formats for the sequential IPV centipede game.
Pooling all data across rounds, parts, and sessions, we find that the rank-sum test rejects the
hypothesis that the distribution of deviations from predicted takes is the same across instittutional
formats (p-value=0.0000).6
In order to better demonstrate the nature of the results, consider the following plot
comparing results across institutional formats within a round (round 1 of part 1). Figure 7 shows
bar graphs for the data. The numbers of observations are on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis
shows the tree node or clock tick (not clock price) at which players first take rather than pass in a
centipede game. Successful take nodes (resp., clock ticks) for takes increase from 1 to 10 on the

6

Again, this understates the difference across formats. In this case, the reason is that data from both
formats demonstrates at least some convergence towards the subgame perfect equilibrium over time; thus
pooling all data mixes data from the end of the experiment, when data from both formats exhibit takes near
the beginning of the game, with data early in the experiment, when results differ more widely across
formats.
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horizontal axis. Note that this implies that payoffs for successful takes increase to the right along
the horizontal axis. The hypothesis that the distributions are the same is rejected with a p-value
of 0.000 (for data from round 1, part 1). Clearly, the distributions of take amounts are different
across institutional formats.
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Figure 7. Takes in Sequential-move IPV Centipede Games

Once again, in addition to comparing data across institutional formats, we can also
compare data from a single format to the theoretical prediction (of taking at the first node). For
the tree format of the IPV centipede game, we reject that the distribution of deviations is
indistinguishable from a distribution of zeroes (p-value=0.0000). For the clock format of the IPV
centipede game, we also reject that the distribution of deviations is indistinguishable from a
distribution of zeroes (p-value=0.0000).
In order to better illustrate the statistical results pertaining to the centipede game, the
following graph plots the time series of the average deviation in “take” from the theoretical
prediction, for each format.
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Figure 8. Take Deviations in Sequential-move IPV Centipede Games

In general, we find that the difference in behavior persists until comparatively many repetitions of
the game have been completed, at which point T2 starts to reliably achieve the theoretical
prediction (in individual rounds) that T1 attained much earlier (in individual rounds). In fact, that
T1 was able to attain the theoretical prediction so early when n=2 is in itself a novel result in the
empirical literature on the centipede game. In addition, we should note that moving to an IPV
environment does not in itself eliminate the failure to unravel typical when using the tree format
(with n=2 and common information); clearly knowing the other player’s exact payoff information
is not in itself decisive in generating failure to unravel.
Finally, in addition to the striking across-subjects results just discussed, the experimental
design allows for within-subjects comparisons to be made as well. The T1-T2-T1 and T2-T1-T2
sessions each allow for a regression analysis in which slope and intercept treatment dummies can
detect structural shifts in an underlying time time trend (of convergence to the subgame perfect
equilibrium).
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Avg. Node of Take = a + b1  Time + b2  Format Dummy
+ b3  Time  Format Dummy + εt

For the T2-T1-T2 case we find that there are significant changes between treatments. An
F-test for coefficents jointly zero rejects that the slope and intercept treatment dummies are equal
to zero (calculated F = 4.56, critical F = 3.35 at 5% level). Graphically, the line fit tells the story.
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Figure 9. Within-subjects T2-T1-T2 Comparisons

Both statistically and visually it appears that switching from the clock format (rounds 1-10) to the
tree format (rounds 11-20) is associated with subjects postponing the act of taking. Furthermore,
switching back to the clock format from the tree format is associated with a return to earlier takes
(in rounds 21-30). While one might claim that the results from rounds 11 through 30 just illustrate
unraveling to the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) – and they might – no such explanation can
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be made for the sharp break between round 10 and round 11, which if anything illustrates
“deconvergence” away from such an equilibrium.
In a further check on the ability of changes in game form to perturb play on a withinsubject basis, the T1-T2-T1 session also reveals significant differences in convergence to
equilibrium across treatments. Switching from the tree format (rounds 1-10) to the clock format
(rounds 11-20) leads to a break in the series, associated with subjects taking much earlier in the
clock format. While this could be argued to be evidence of convergence to the SPE (though such
an argument would incorrectly ignore the role of the time trend variable in controlling for such
convergence) the switch back to the tree format in rounds 21-30 is associated with a break away
from the SPE (counter to the time trend); this puts to rest the idea that switching formats does not
affect play on a within-subjects basis. Statistically the treatments are significant (calculated F =
12.2151, critical F = 3.35 at 5% level), and graphically the results are as below.
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6.3 Simultaneous Dutch Results
Behavior across isomorphic versions of the simultaneous-bid Dutch auction employing different
institutional formats is different. Pooling data across all sessions for the same treatment (e.g. all
rounds from all parts for T7 from all experiment sessions are analyzed as belonging to one
distribution) and performing rank-sum tests to ascertain whether we can reject the hypothesis that
the distribution of deviations from theoretical predictions for T8 is the same as that for T7, we
find that a rank-sum test rejects that the distributions are indistinguishable (p-value=0.0000).7
For the tree format of the simultaneous Dutch auction, we find that the distribution of
deviations is significantly different from a distribution of zeroes (p-value=0.0000). Similarly, for
the clock format of the simultaneous Dutch auction, the distribution of deviations is significantly
different from a distribution of zeroes (p-value=0.0000). Note that the average deviation for T7 is
0.6666, while the average deviation for T8 is 1.2565; thus bidding is higher in T8 than in T7.
Graphically, a time series plot of the average deviation from the theoretical prediction, in
each round, for each of T7 and T8, shows both how the results differ across treatments and where
they sit relative to the theoretical prediction in each round.

7

These tests potentially understate the difference between T7 and T8, for the same reasons given in
footnote 5.
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Figure 11. Bid Deviations in Simultaneous-bid Dutch Auctions

6.4 Simultaneous IPV Centipede Results
Behavior differs across institutional formats for the simultaneous-take IPV centipede game.
Pooling all data across rounds, parts, and sessions, we find that the rank-sum test rejects the
hypothesis that the distribution of deviations from predicted take is the same across treatments (pvalue=0.0000).
For the tree format of the simultaneous-take IPV centipede game, we find that the
distribution of deviations is significantly different from a distribution of zeroes (p-value=0.0000).
In a similar test using data from the clock format of the simulataneous IPV centipede game, we
find that the distribution of deviations is significantly different from a distribution of zeroes (pvalue=0.0000).
In order to better illustrate the statistical results pertaining to the simultaneous-take IPV
centipede game, the following graph plots the time series of the average deviation in “take” from
the theoretical prediction for each institutional format.
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Figure 12. Take Deviations in Simultaneous-move IPV Centipede Games

Note that in individual rounds, starting in the fourth round, perfect unraveling is observed in the
clock format of the simultaneous-take IPV centipede game. In fact, from round 4 onward, 25 of
27 rounds exhibit perfect unraveling by every pair of subjects across all pooled sessions of the
experiment. This prevalence of unraveling we believe to be unprecedented for two-player
centipede games.

6.5 Simultaneous versus Sequential Results: How does Dynamic Structure Matter?
At this point we have established that Institutional Format (IF) is a significant determinant of how
people behave in otherwise theoretically-isomorphic games. What about Dynamic Structure
(DS)? Might the structure of “who moves when” have an impact on behavior beyond that already
captured in a risk neutral Nash Equilibrium model of bidding, or in a subgame perfect equilibrium
model of takes in a centipede game? We address this by looking at deviations between actual data
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and theoretical predictions across games with different Dynamic Structure, but the same
Institutional Format.
While the bid functions for sequential Dutch and simultaneous Dutch are different, one
can put them on a comparable footing by looking at deviations in the data relative to their
respective predictions (based on said different bid functions). The prediction across all rounds for
both the simultaneous and sequential IPV centipede games is for a take at the first node.
We find that in every comparison – simultaneous Dutch in tree format versus sequential
Dutch in tree format (p value = 0.0000), simultaneous IPV centipede in tree format versus
sequential IPV centipede in tree format (p value = 0.0000), simultaneous Dutch in clock format
versus sequential Dutch in clock format (p value = 0.0000), simultaneous IPV centipede in clock
format versus sequential IPV centipede in clock format (p value = 0.0000) – the distributions of
deviations from theory are different across simultaneous and sequential structure games.
Moreover, the deviations from theory always have the following feature: simultaneous always
bids higher (resp., takes earlier) than sequential; this is true across all forms of Dutch auction and
centipede games. Graphically, time series plots of deviations make this clear.
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Figure 13. Bid Deviaions in Tree Format Dutch Auctions
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Figure 14. Take Deviations in Tree Format IPV Centipede Games
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Figure 15. Bid Deviations in Clock Format Dutch Auctions
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Note that these results are not predicted by theory; the implications of move order for
equilibrium are already in the bid functions used to make the prediction (resp., subgame perfect
equilbrium prediction of a take at the first node). We are instead dealing with something different
– something “new”, at least in terms of economists’ awareness of it. Namely, there is something
about being “on the clock” at the same time as another player in a real time game that makes
people behave differently than when they alternate “exclusive” turns in a real time game. In
particular, players in simultaneous versions of a real time game seem less willing to let the game
continue; this generalizes across Dutch auctions and centipede games.

7. Summary and Conclusions
We get some striking results. Winning bids are consistently higher and successful take nodes
consistently earlier with the clock format than with the tree format for four games with
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independent private values: sequential-bid Dutch auctions, sequential-take centipede games,
simultaneous-bid Dutch auctions, and simultaneous-bid centipede games.
Looking at variations in the centipede game, we find that the rate at which the
equilibrium is approached can be controlled by variations in IF and DS. Starting with the
sequential-take IPV centipede game in tree format (at one extreme) we find comparatively late
unraveling (not unlike findings reported by McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992). But from that baseline
we find that changing either the DS to simultaneous-take or the IF to clock format leads to earlier
convergence to the unraveling prediction. The convergence to the unraveling outcome is more
pronounced with the change in IF than the change in DS. And when we change both the IF and
DS – arriving then at the simultaneous-take IPV centipede game in clock format – we find
extremely rapid convergence to the unraveling equilibrium . It is also notable that we find all of
these results with two-player (n = 2) games. This is important for two reasons: (a) this pushes
back the boundary for which strong unraveling results have been obtained (Rapoport, et al., 2003
and Murphy, et al., 2006 report results for n = 3 and n = 7) and (b) holding n constant and
focusing on (clock and tree) institutional formats has allowed us to generate regularities that
generalize across games.
In the Dutch auction, we obtain close to the risk neutral prediction when we use the tree
format rather than the traditional clock format. The clock format, on the other hand, yields bids
greater than risk neutral theoretical bids. Overall, we get data that more closely resemble
theoretical predictions for both Dutch auctions and centipede games when we use the (clock or
tree) format that is not traditionally associated with that market or game.
The finding that clock games experience earlier takes than tree games is robust to
implementations in both sequential and simultaneous dynamic structures, and both centipede
games and Dutch auctions. That is to say, clock formats reliably produce earlier takes than tree
formats in a manner than generalizes across different types of games (i.e. markets or stylized
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game theoretical constructs) and across different structuring (simultaneous or sequential) within
these types of games. This result holds across all of our treatments.
What this seems to be telling us is that the institutional format is the primary determinant
of what have been accepted empirical properties of both Dutch auctions and centipede games. In
that way, these “stylized facts” of the properties of Dutch auctions and centipede games are
determined by the clock or tree choice of institutional format in implementation of these games.
As such: (a) the behavioral properties of the centipede game are not independent of its traditional
implementation in tree format; and (b) the behavioral properties of the Dutch auction are not
independent of its traditional implementation in clock format. The institutional formats of these
games are essential features that drive real behavior, not mere details of implementation. In this
way, we are finding results for centipede games that correspond to long accepted results that the
institutional formats of markets are central features that determine their allocation and pricing
properties (Smith, 1982; Plott, 1982; Friedman and Ostroy, 1995; Zhan and Friedman, 2007).
Furthermore, we have documented an additional regularity involving dynamic structure.
Specifically, in all four of our real time games, simultaneous-move structure leads to earlier takes
than sequential-move structure. This is readily apparent for the centipede game (as the
equilibrium is the same in all rounds of all implementations), but is also (if less obviously) true
for the Dutch auction. In the Dutch auction, we find that the deviations from the risk neutral Nash
equilibrium predictions are greater for the simultaneous-bid auction than the sequential-bid
auction. In addition, in a number of rounds we find that winning bids in the simultaneous-bid
Dutch auction are higher than winning bids in the sequential-bid Dutch auction in absolute terms
as well. This is particularly striking given that (with our parameterization) the bid functions are
such that the simultaneous-bid Dutch auction should never yield higher prices than the sequentialbid Dutch auction.
Overall we find that what might be considered fairly subtle aspects of the received way of
implementing games in real time do in fact have quite powerful effects. The fact that they had
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been sitting in the background, bundled into canonical institutions or games, does not mean they
were not always affecting behavior. And the fact that we now know they are there should help all
researchers in designing institutions and analyzing data generated therein. In future research we
aim to search for other such effects, and to shed light on their functioning.
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